There are well-known and extensive differences in color preferences between individuals, but there are also within-individual differences from one time to another. Despite the seeming independence between these individual and temporal effects, we propose that they have the same underlying cause: people's ecological experiences with color-associated objects and events. Our approach is motivated by the Ecological Valence Theory (EVT; Palmer & Schloss, 2010) which states that preference for a given color is determined by the combined valence (liking/disliking) of all objects and events associated with that color. We define three ecologically-based hypotheses for explaining temporal and individual differences in color preferences concerning: (1) differences in object valences, (2) differences in color-object associations, and (3) differences in object activations in the mind when preferences are measured. We review prior studies that support these hypotheses and raise open research questions about untested predictions. We also extend the computational framework of the EVT by defining a single weighted average equation that captures both individual and temporal differences in color preferences. Finally, we consider other factors that potentially contribute to color preferences, including abstract symbolic associations, color in design, and psychophysical and/or physiological factors.
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Overview
How many times have you heard the question: ''What is your favorite color?" It seems so simple and innocuous that one seldom, if ever, gives it careful thought. A moment's reflection, however, reveals some important underlying assumptions. First, it implies that color preferences vary from one person to another. After all, if everyone had the same color preferences, there would be no point in asking the question in the first place. Second, the question implies that the answer is likely to be relatively invariant over time, as if a person's favorite color were a stable trait. If this were so, their answer would allow one to make predictions about what that person will like in the future. Are these assumptions true and how do they relate to our understanding of the nature of color preferences?
The first assumption is clearly true: there are indeed vast and well-documented differences in color preference between individuals (e.g., McManus, Jones, & Cottrell, 1981; Schloss, Hawthorne-Madell, & Palmer, 2015) . The nature of these differences, however, is not yet well understood, nor are the variables that underlie them. The status of the second assumption is less clear. We do know that differences in color preferences over time within an individual are much less variable than differences between individuals (e.g., McManus et al., 1981; Taylor & Franklin, 2012; Schloss, Hawthorne-Madell et al., 2015) , at least over short periods of time. There are also recent indications, however, that color preferences can and do vary systematically over time, depending on the temporal context in which the measurements are taken.
Although it may seem as if individual differences and temporal differences in color preferences are distinct and unrelated topics, we suggest that they can -and should -be united within a single theoretical framework. The unifying framework we propose is that both are based, at least in part, on the person's emotional responses to ecological objects and events. That is, we will ague that both differences between individuals and differences within individuals over time can be understood as arising from people's http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2017.01.010 0042-6989/Ó 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
responses to their environments as they unfold over time. More specifically, we examine individual and temporal differences through the lens of Palmer and Schloss's (2010) Ecological Valence Theory (EVT) of color preference, which posits that a person's preference for a given color is determined by his/her combined valences (liking/disliking) for all objects and entities that person associates with that color.
With respect to the first assumption, we argue that the vast individual differences in color preferences can be explained, in part, by individual differences in ecological experiences with colored objects (e.g., Schloss, Hawthorne-Madell et al., 2015; Schloss, Poggesi, & Palmer, 2011) . By learning about the color preferences of individuals, we therefore gain potential insights into the nature of their previous color-related experiences. With respect to the second assumption, color preferences can and do change in systematic ways that depend, in part, on changes in the degree to which different kinds of color-associated objects are activated in observers' minds when tested at different times (Schloss, Nelson, Parker, Heck, & Palmer, in press; .
We will first discuss a brief history of individual differences in color preference (Section 2). We then review previous literature on ecological accounts of individual differences and temporal changes in color preferences (Section 3). We do so within the framework of three variables that the EVT suggests should be relevant: (1) the valences of objects (how much a person likes/dislikes them), (2) the associations between objects and colors, and (3) the activation of object representations in the mind. Finally, we discuss additional factors that might contribute to temporal and/or individual differences, including abstract symbolic associations, color in the context of design and psychophysical and physiological factors (Section 4).
A parallel goal of the present article is to extend the computational framework of the EVT to include terms for individual and temporal differences in the variables mentioned above. Schloss et al. (in press) extended Palmer and Schloss's (2010) original formulation to include temporal changes, but here we go further by developing a single equation that can capture both temporal and individual differences (Section 3.3) . Organizing the literature on the EVT in this manner also enabled us to identify and articulate several open questions that constitute salient avenues for future research.
A brief history of individual differences in color preferences
We begin by briefly summarizing previous work on color preferences. Early research was plagued by individual differences, even leading some to conclude that color preferences were too idiosyncratic to be studied meaningfully (e.g., Chandler, 1928; von Allesch, 1924) . In response, much of the later research on color preferences focused on establishing that there is indeed a clear signal in average color preferences among the ''noise" of individual differences (e.g., Eysenck, 1941; Granger, 1952; Guilford & Smith, 1959; McManus et al., 1981) . These studies generally indicated that bluish hues were most preferred, yellow and yellow-greens were the least preferred, and the other hues were in between. However, McManus et al. (1981) emphasized that despite these robust patterns in averaged data, there are substantial differences between individuals in terms of preferences for hue, value, and chroma. These individual differences are not necessarily noise; they can be explained if the relevant variables can be identified.
To illustrate the extensive individual differences in color preference data, Fig. 1 shows the hue preference data from Palmer and Schloss (2010) for individual subjects, averaged over the saturated (S), light (L), muted (M), and dark (D) cuts (saturation/lightness levels). Here, we depict z-scores of the hue preference functions for each participant to emphasize the relative differences in preference for these eight hues between participants. The thick black line shows the mean of the individual z-scores. The traditional hue preference profile is apparent in the mean (Guilford & Smith, 1959; McManus et al., 1981) , with a peak around blue and a trough around yellow/yellow-green. Indeed, there was a strong correlation (r(6) = 0.92, p < 0.01) between the mean preference z-scores for these 8 hues and the same participants' ratings of how blue vs. yellow the hues of these colors appeared (also averaged over cuts). However, the individual participant data displayed in thin gray lines show that this pattern is characteristic of only some participants, as the analogous correlations calculated for each of the 48 individual participants ranged from r(6) = +0.89 (p < 0.01) to r (6) = À0.41 (p = 0.31). As highlighted by the circles around the minimum and maximum at each hue, for every individual who loves a given hue, there is another who hates it.
This methodological approach to understanding color preferences mirrors the approach typical in perception and cognition research more broadly. Researchers tend to ignore unexplained variability by averaging their data over different individuals and different testing times. Although averaging can be essential for revealing patterns that are imbedded in random variation, it is possible that some of that variation is not really random at all.
Having established that average color preferences are indeed systematic across observers, researchers are now beginning to explore whether the alleged ''noise" of individual differences can be explained. One recent approach was modeling individual differences by fitting different weights on the cone-contrast axes (S and LM) for individual participants . The idea is that a single linear equation can be used to predict an individual's preference (p c ) for a given color (c), by using the data to estimate the weights (w 1 and w 2 ) on the cone contrast axes of S (roughly, violet to yellowish-green) and LM (roughly, red to cyan) and a constant (a):
The weights were estimated using multiple linear regression to predict the individuals' color preferences for a set of eight colors that varied in hue but were constant in saturation and lightness.
To predict preferences for sets of colors that varied in lightness and saturation in addition to hue, Ling and Hurlbert (2007) extended Hurlbert and Ling's (2007) original cone-contrast model to include parameters for luminance contrast (Lum c , or L + M + S contrast) and saturation (Sat c ; which is not a cone contrast):
They tested this model on several sets of colors and found that it explained 46-61% of the variance in individual participants' color preference judgments depending on the color set.
This cone-contrast approach to modeling individual differences in color preferences has both advantages and limitations. A clear empirical advantage is that it provides a single equation that summarizes an individual's pattern of color preferences, which may generalize to any specified color, even ones that were not in the test set. A serious theoretical limitation, however, is that it does not explain why individuals differ in their preferences for the same colors in the way they do. For example, it does not explain why Person A has a positive weight on S (preferring purplish colors to yellowish-green ones) whereas Person B has a negative weight on S (preferring yellowish-green colors to purplish ones). Nor does it explain why Person C has greater weight on S than on LM (their preference pattern is better summarized by differences in the purplish vs. yellowish-green dimension than by differences in the red vs. cyan dimension), whereas Person D has a stronger weight on LM than on S (their preference pattern is better summarized by differences in the red vs. cyan dimension than by differences in the purplish vs. yellowish-green dimension).
There is also a further question about whether the bipolar structure of the cone-contrast dimensions is actually appropriate for color preferences. This assumption is embedded within the conecontrast model and implies, for example, that someone who very much likes purplish colors must also tend to dislike yellowishgreen colors (and vice versa). Bimler, Brunt, Lanning, & Bonnardel (2014) challenged this opponency assumption in their analysis of individual differences in color preferences. They conducted principle component analysis (PCA) to reduce the underlying structure of the individuals' data and found four main components, two of which were somewhat color-opponent in nature but two of which were not. One particular component, PC3, was elongated along a purplish vs. yellowish green axis, indicating that both endpoints of the opponent dimension can be liked.
In this same study, Bimler et al. (2014) conducted an exploratory analysis to test whether individual participants' color preferences could be predicted by Big-Five personality factors (Goldberg et al., 2006; John & Srivastava, 1999) . In particular, they reported a negative correlation between individuals' loadings on the first principle component and their scores on openness and neuroticism, meaning that those who scored higher on those dimensions tended to like cooler colors less and/or warmer colors more than those who scored lower on those dimensions.
An ecological approach to temporal and individual differences in color preferences
The theory of color preference on which we will focus in the remainder of this article is the Ecological Valence Theory (EVT). Its primary virtue with respect to the present article is that it provides a testable account of why individuals might differ in their color preferences and why color preferences might change over time. The EVT's core prediction is that someone's preference for a given color is determined by how much that particular person likes all the objects and entities that he/she associates with that particular color (Palmer & Schloss, 2010) 1 . As a result, it predicts (and evidence supports) that people generally like colors that remind them of objects and entities they like (e.g., saturated blue, which is mostly associated with positive objects such as clear sky and clean water)
Preference Z-Scores 1 The EVT assumes that the vast majority of object valences are determined by noncolor factors, such as the taste and smell of foods and the function that objects serve. These object preferences are usually based on factors that have little or nothing to do with their color appearance, such as liking ripe strawberries because they are delicious and disliking vomit (for obvious reasons). This does not mean that there are no cases in which people like objects based on their color. For example, you may like a particular sweater because of its muted blue-green color. The EVT implies that your preference for that color was largely determined by prior experiences with objects associated with that color, and it will be updated by your experience with the sweater. That is, if the sweater is comfortable and you get complements when you wear it, you will come to like the color more, but if the sweater is itchy and your best friend tells you that it is unflattering, you will come to like the color less.
and dislike colors that are associated with objects and entities they dislike (e.g., dark yellow, whose greenish-brown appearance is mostly associated with negative objects such as biological waste and rotting food). Although the EVT was originally formulated to explain average patterns in color preferences, analogous applications have subsequently been shown to predict preferences for odors (Schloss, Goldberger, Palmer, & Levitan, 2015) and for visual textures (Stephens & Hoffman, 2016) . In the following sections 3.1-3.3 we will examine specific hypotheses stemming from the EVT about how temporal and individual differences in color preferences might arise. To do so, however, we must first describe the experimental methods devised by Palmer and Schloss (2010) and the basic Weighted Affective Valence Estimate (WAVE) equation they used to test the EVT quantitatively.
Testing the EVT with the WAVE equation
As a first test of the EVT at the group level, Palmer and Schloss (2010) developed the WAVE procedure and equation to determine whether group-average preferences for each presented color could be predicted by group-average valences for the set of objects associated with that color, weighted by how well that color matched the color of each associated object. They collected data from four different groups of participants: (1) the color preference group rated their preference for the 32 Berkeley Color Project colors (BCP-32; see Fig. 1 ), (2) the object description group viewed the same colors but reported brief verbal descriptions of any object whose characteristic color they associated with each color, (3) the object valence group saw text describing of the objects named by the object description group and rated the valence (positive-to-negative) of each of those objects, and (4) the object-color match group saw each object description together with the color with which it had been associated and rated how well the color on the screen matched the color of the named objects. (See Palmer and Schloss (2010) for further methodological details.) From these data they calculated the WAVE (W c ) for each color (c) as a single number that summarizes the average valence (v o ) of all the objects (o) that are associated with the color, weighted by the object-color match (w co ) using the following equation
The WAVEs for the 32 colors explained 80% of the variance in average color preferences. Fig. 2 shows schematic diagrams that we call WAVEnets, which are graphical representations of how preference for a given color is influenced by the variables in the WAVE equation. We will use WAVEnet diagrams throughout this article to illustrate the implications of manipulating object valences, color-object associations, and object activations on color preferences. In WAVEnet diagrams, the central square represents a target color c and the circles represent (a representative subset of) the objects o that are associated with c. The sizes of the circles represent the strength of preference for the objects and the size of the square represents the strength of preference for the color (larger ? more preferred). The distance between each circle and the central square represents the degree to which the color of object o matches color c (shorter connection ? stronger match).
The two WAVEnets in Fig. 2 represent relative preferences for saturated blue (c 1 ) and dark yellow (c 2 ). The objects associated with saturated blue are generally more preferred than those associated with dark yellow, as depicted by larger circle sizes surrounding saturated blue. The difference in average object valence for these two colors results in greater preference for saturated blue than for dark yellow (Palmer & Schloss, 2010) , as depicted by the larger square for c 1 than for c 2 .
Relating group differences and individual differences
Before delving into the discussion of temporal and individual differences, we will take a short detour into a general methodological issue concerning the relation between group differences and individual differences. It is tempting to view this contrast as a binary distinction in how the data are analyzed: either averaging over participants (a group effect) or analyzing effects at the level of single participants (an individual difference effect). Although this distinction is certainly relevant, the situation is less clear-cut when the groups are defined by characteristics of the individuals that comprise them. After all, individuals are defined by the conjunction of many different attributes, each of which they share with many other individuals. The individuals who share a given attribute define a set that can be studied as a group. Group studies of color preference that compare, for example, males versus females, artists versus non-artists, Republicans versus Democrats, or broccolilovers versus broccoli-haters are all examples in which groupbased effects can reveal the influence of factors that are relevant at the level of individual differences, even though they are studied as a statistical sample rather than as individuals. If the sorting of individuals into well-matched groups has been performed appropriately with respect to possible confounds (e.g., males are more likely to be color-deficient than females, so participants should be screened for normal color vision, if possible) those contaminating factors will have been controlled. Therefore, any group differences revealed in the dependent variable(s) are likely to be due to the difference(s) between individuals having the common attribute as defined operationally through the sorting procedure.
The same general logic applies to temporal differences as well. If the dependent variable(s) is measured at different times that are well-controlled for potential confounds, any differences discovered are likely to be due to the different temporal contexts in which the measurements are made. It is often fairly easy to control for person-based confounds because the same participants can be studied at different times using a within-subjects design. In this case, however, care must be taken to control for order effects, since earlier measurements may influence later measurements. Other potential confounds are more difficult to control. For example, in testing whether color preferences vary due to seasonal variations in the colors present in the natural environment, many correlated differences are present that cannot be controlled except statistically, such as temperature and other weather conditions that cannot easily be separated from the nominal season.
Such group-defined difference studies are typically blunt instruments for measuring differences due to individuals or specific times, especially when the sorting factor is binary rather than based on some underlying continuum (e.g., a novice/expert distinction rather than the number of years of training or experience). Nevertheless, they have a legitimate place in the study of individual and temporal differences, and several of the studies described below fall into this category. The crucial question with respect to the present topic of ecological effects on color preferences is whether the individual differences that are identified are ecological rather than intrinsic to the individual. That is, do they arise from some aspect of the ecological relation between the individual and his or her environment (e.g., how much he/she likes the different objects and institutions associated with different colors) or do they stem from some other factor -e.g., color-deficiency (Álvaro, Moreira, Lillo, & Franklin, 2015) or personality (Bimler et al., 2014) -that is specific to the individual but unrelated to ecological associations. If one were to directly test for the role of heritable factors on color preferences it would be important to assess the color preferences of monozygotic twins that were separated at birth. Although this question is beyond the scope of the present article, it provides an exciting direction or future research.
EVT-based hypotheses for temporal and individual differences in color preferences
When applied to color preferences at the level of individual differences, the EVT implies that people who have different colorrelated experiences from each other are likely to have different color preferences. When applied to temporal differences, the EVT implies that as experiences with color-related objects change, color preferences are also likely to change. In the following sections we will describe and present evidence for three hypotheses that stem from these broad predictions: (1) the differential valence hypothesis (Section 3.3.1), (2) the differential object-association hypothesis (Section 3.3.2), and (3) the differential activation hypothesis (Section 3.3.3). We note that although we refer to prior literature as evidence supporting these hypotheses, this is the first time we explicitly define them. In doing so, we will use extended WAVE equations and corresponding WAVEnet diagrams to explain the implications of the three hypotheses. In some cases, we refer to the WAVE equation to discuss previous data that were originally reported without reference to the WAVE (e.g., Strauss et al., 2013; Schloss & Palmer, 2014) , which allows us to draw deeper connections between the results of prior studies. We will also develop a unified WAVE equation that captures both individual and temporal differences in color preferences within a single equation (Section 3.3.3).
The differential valence hypothesis
The differential valence hypothesis with respect to individual differences posits that individuals who have different valences for their experiences with the same objects of a given color will tend to have different preferences for that color. The initial test of this hypothesis came from a group-defined study that compared the color preferences of students at two rival universities: University of California, Berkeley and Stanford University . Because the two schools are rivals, UC Berkeley students generally like UC Berkeley more than Stanford students do, and Stanford students generally like Stanford more than Berkeley students do. Individuals within each university also varied in the degree of positive affect they have for their school (''school spirit"), which allowed for tests of individual, as well as group differences. Thus, this is a situation in which different people have quite different valences for the same objects-the two universities-when they are otherwise similar in terms of sex, age, intelligence, etc. The question is whether they have corresponding differences in their preferences for the colors associated with those objects (i.e., Berkeley's blue and gold vs. Stanford's red and white).
To represent the differential valence hypothesis in a WAVE equation, we describe the concept of the ''Personal-WAVE" (see Schloss, Hawthorne-Madell et al., 2015) . Here, we extend the original WAVE equation from Palmer and Schloss (2010; Eq. (3) ) to include an index variable for individual participants. The personal-WAVE, denoted W ci , for an individual, i, and color, c, requires the additional i-subscript to represent the different valences (and/or color-object weights) that different individuals may have with respect to the same objects:
According to the differential valence hypothesis, if two individuals (say, i 1 and i 2 ) have different valences for the same object, o (v o,1 and v o,2 ) and, if all else is equal, then they will have different preferences for color c. It follows that if Stanford students like Stanford University better than Berkeley students do, and all else is equal, then Stanford students should like Stanford red more than Berkeley students do. This situation is illustrated by the WAVEnets in Fig. 3 . The valence of Stanford University (represented by the capital S) is greater for a Stanford student (Fig. 3A) than for a Berkeley student (Fig. 3B ) with all other object valences and object-color matches being the same. Under these circumstances, the Stanford student's preference for Stanford red (depicted by the size of the central square in Fig. 3A) is greater than the Berkeley student's preference for the same color (depicted by the size of the central square in Fig. 3B ).
To test this prediction, assessed the color preferences of Berkeley and Stanford students by testing them in a local laboratory at the students' home university. Participants first judged each color individually (including the relevant shades of blue, gold, red, white) and then they judged pairs of colors as a whole (including the relevant combinations of blue-on-gold, gold-on-blue, red-on-white, and white-on-red). In both cases, the university colors were randomly intermixed within a much larger set of single colors or color pairs that served as distractors. group level, students generally preferred their own school's colors: the average ''composite Berkeley-Stanford color preference" (i.e., the preference for Berkeley colors minus the preference for Stanford colors) was significantly greater for the Berkeley students than for the Stanford students for both single colors and color pairs (Fig. 4A ).
More directly pertinent to the present discussion of individual differences, Fig. 4B shows the correlations between the individual participants' composite Berkeley-Stanford color preference scores and their amount of self-reported school sprit for their own university. For Berkeley students these correlations were significantly positive for both single colors and color pairs, indicating that the more Berkeley spirit they had, the more they liked Berkeley colors relative to Stanford colors. Likewise, the more Stanford spirit Stanford students had, the less they liked Berkeley colors relative to Stanford colors. Therefore, individuals who had different valences for the same objects (operationalized as self-reported school spirit for their own university) had different preference for the colors associated with those objects.
These effects of school affiliation and school spirit were specific to the school colors and did not generalize to other, similar colors in the BCP-32 set. For example, differences in preferences for Stanford red did not generalize to BCP Dark Red, even though they were both nominally dark red. To interpret those results in light of the current discussion of WAVEnets, we posit that the object-color match between Stanford and BCP Dark Red is too weak (i.e., the Stanford node is too far from the color node in the WAVEnet representation) to reliably influence preference for BCP Dark Red. To test that possibility directly, it would be useful to systematically vary the match between colors and novel objects to assess whether the influence of those objects on preference for a color weakens as object-color match decreases.
The second, and more comprehensive, investigation of the differential valence hypothesis was undertaken in a study aimed at predicting individual participants' color preferences from individualized personal-WAVEs (Schloss, Hawthorne-Madell et al., 2015) . It directly tested whether each participant's pattern of color preferences was better predicted by how much the person himself or herself liked the objects associated with the colors than by how much other individual participants in the same study liked the same objects associated with the same colors. The differential valence hypothesis predicts that an individual's color preferences should be better explained by WAVEs computed from his or her own object valences than from WAVEs computed from other individuals' object valences. To test this prediction, Schloss, Hawthorne-Madell et al. (2015) had 48 participants perform the color preference task, object valence task, and object-color match task as described above, but this time completely withinsubjects. The tasks were completed on different days. Eq. (4) 2 was then used to calculate personal-WAVEs, W ci , for each individual, i, for each of the 32 colors, c, using the set of 222 object descriptions reported by Palmer and Schloss (2010) . But the individual participant's ratings of the valence (v oi ) and the color-object match (w coi ) were used, rather than the group means across all participants. The number of objects n associated with each color c is constant across individuals i because the same 222 object descriptions were used for all individuals, so n ci was the same for each individual. The group data from this study closely replicated the group data from Palmer and Schloss (2010) , despite using within-subject data collection methods (i.e., the 32 group-averaged WAVEs predicted 76% of the variance in the 32 group-averaged color preferences versus 80% in the original study).
To test the differential valence hypothesis for individual differences, Schloss, Hawthorne-Madell et al. (2015) correlated each of the 48 participant's preference ratings of the 32 colors with his/ her own 32 personal-WAVEs and with the 32 personal-WAVEs of every other participant. The resulting 48 Â 48 correlation matrix contains all pairwise correlations between individuals' directly rated color preferences and computationally derived personalWAVEs. The correlations along the main diagonal represented within-subject preference-WAVE correlations and the offdiagonal correlations represented between-subject preference-WAVE correlations. As shown in Fig. 5 the mean of the withinsubject correlations for the 48 individuals was +0.55, 3 and the mean of the between-subject correlations across participants was +0.41, significantly lower than the within-subjects mean (left two bars in Fig. 5 ). These results thus indicate that an individual's pattern of color preferences is better predicted by how much he/she likes the objects associated with those colors than by how much other indi- viduals like the same objects associated with those colors, at least when using the same object associations for everyone. We will return to this study and elaborate on the rest of Fig. 5 in Section 3.3.2. The differential valence hypothesis for temporal changes implies that color preferences should tend to change if the valence of objects associated with the colors changes. The valence of objects might change for a variety of reasons. For example, a child might dream for years of going to a particular college (strong positive valence for the college) only to find that its application is rejected. This negative news could cause the positive affect for that college to decrease. There is also a large and well-documented literature on the conditioning of taste that show the valence of objects does change with experience. Classic experiments have shown, for example, that animals come to dislike substances they have ingested if they become sick after ingestion, even if the causal event was exposure to radiation, which is independent of the substance's taste (e.g., Garcia, Kimeldorf, & Koelling, 1955 , and adapted from ). conditioning experiments for positive affect in rats have shown increases in preference for substances that were paired with rewarding brain-stimulation (Ettenberg & White, 1978) . There is evidence that humans also can be conditioned to change their preferences for objects after they co-occur with positive/negative stimuli, known as evaluative conditioning (De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010) . If an object that changes valence is associated with a particular color, the differential valence hypothesis implies that people's preference for that particular color should decrease or increase accordingly. Future research is necessary to test this prediction.
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The differential object-association hypothesis
The differential object-association hypothesis for individual differences states that individuals who associate different objects with the same color will have different preferences for that color, to the extent that the mean valence of those objects also differs. The logic behind this hypothesis is that the valence of particular objects should only factor into an individual's color preferences if the individual has experienced or knows about the object and therefore has a representation of its valence. To illustrate, consider the WAVEnets in Fig. 6 . Person A associates ripe strawberries with this shade of red, but Person B has never experienced and knows nothing about ripe strawberries. Otherwise, the objects (o 2 À o 11 ) in both WAVEnets are identical with identical valences and object-color matches. This means that ripe strawberries will factor into Person A's preference for that red color, but not Person B's. If ripe strawberries are strongly positive for Person A relative to the other objects associated with that shade of red, and ripe strawberries are absent for Person B, then, all else being equal, Person A should like that red color more than Person B does. We hasten to add that if ripe strawberries were strongly negative for Person A relative to objects o 2 À o 11 , then, all else being equal, Person A should like that red color less than Person B does.
This logic leads to two predictions that were tested in Schloss, Hawthorne-Madell et al.'s (2015) study on individual differences in color preferences. The first prediction is that idiosyncraticWAVEs for a given individual, based only on their own idiosyncratic color-object associations predict their color preferences better than idiosyncratic-WAVEs based only on other participants' idiosyncratic object associations. In addition to computing personal-WAVEs for individual participants from a standard set of 222 object descriptions (collected by Palmer & Schloss, 2010) , as described in Section 3.3.1, they also computed idiosyncraticWAVEs for each participant based on his or her own color-object associations. Participants provided the data for idiosyncratic WAVEs by describing as many object associates as they could for each presented color and then rating their preference for those objects. The number of objects n associated with each color c can vary across individuals i (n ci ) because different individuals could report different numbers of objects for each color. Within the idiosyncratic object sets there were objects that were relevant for a given individual that were not relevant for other participants in the study (e.g., ''friend's junior prom dress" described by one participant for light orange). As shown in Fig. 5 , the mean of the within-subject (WS) correlations between each individual's color preferences and his or her idiosyncratic-WAVEs was significantly greater than the mean of the between-subject (BS) correlations based on the same set of color preferences and idiosyncraticWAVEs.
The second prediction is that combined-WAVEs that include both the generic set of 222 object descriptions (the basis for the personal-WAVEs) and the idiosyncratic set of objects (the basis for the idiosyncratic-WAVEs) will explain more variance (with the same number of estimated parameters) than personalWAVEs or idiosyncratic-WAVEs alone. Indeed, the within-subject (WS) correlations between color preferences and combinedWAVEs were significantly greater than those with personalWAVEs or idiosyncratic-WAVEs alone (Fig. 5) . It is important to note that this result was obtained by integrating the two sets of objects before computing the composite combined-WAVEs rather than simply by doing a multiple regression on the two separate WAVEs (personal-WAVEs and idiosyncratic-WAVEs). The latter analysis would logically dictate that the combined regression explain at least as much variance as the better of the two separate predictors alone, but this is not the case when the two object sets were integrated into a single list. (See Schloss, Hawthorne-Madell et al. (2015) for details of the integration procedure.) These results indicates that to understand individual differences in color preferences, it is relevant to consider the unique color experiences of individual participants as well as their common color experiences. Taylor and Franklin (2012) have also alluded to the differential object-association hypothesis in explaining gender differences in color preferences using gender specific-WAVEs. They reported that males showed a stronger preference for saturated and dark orange than females did, which was captured by gender-specific WAVEsthe male WAVE peaked at saturated orange, but the female WAVE did not. They explained that this was partly because males associated sunrise and sunshine (strong positive valence) with saturated and dark orange, whereas females did not. This is not to say that females have not experienced sunrises and sunshine, clearly they have. The implication is that the particular females in Taylor and Franklin's experiment did not associate those objects with saturated or dark orange, so those objects did not contribute to their preferences for those colors.
To our knowledge, no studies have been reported on the differential object-association hypothesis for temporal differences. It implies that it is possible to increase/decrease people's color preferences by exposing them to new experiences with strongly positive/negative colored objects. Such a manipulation would, perhaps, be more effective with younger children who have fewer colorobject associations (n ci ) to dilute the effects of new color-object associations.
The differential activation hypothesis
The differential activation hypothesis states that individuals who differ in the degree to which particular color-associated objects are activated in their mind at the time of testing will tend to have different preferences for that color. 4 It further specifies that as the activation of color-associated objects varies within an individual, that individual's color preferences will also tend to change. Unlike the differential valence hypothesis and differential objectassociation hypotheses, which stem directly from the original WAVE equation defined in Palmer and Schloss (2010) , the differential acti- 4 The differential activation hypothesis implies that such differences in color preference will occur only to the degree that the valences of the differently activated objects are also different. If the two differently activated objects in the above example had the same valences -say, ripe strawberries and ripe raspberries -then no difference in color preference due to differential activation would be evident. That is why, in stating the differential activation hypothesis, we stated that differential activation ''will tend to have" different color preferences. Whether it does or not will depend on the relative valences as well as the activations of the objects involved. An added complexity is that one cannot predict whether the relevant color preference will go up or down simply as a function of increasing or decreasing the activation of an associated object, because it depends on whether the valence of the given object is higher or lower relative to the other objects associated with the color. If the object is more positively valued than the rest of the objects associated with that color, increasing its activation will make preference for the color increase and decreasing its activation will tend to make it decrease. If the object is more negatively valued than the average of the other objects associated with the color, the reverse will be true: higher activations will make preference for the color decrease and decreasing its activation will tend to make it increase.
vation hypothesis introduces a new concept: the degree to which object representations are activated in the mind of the observer at the moment the color is judged. The differential activation hypothesis is conceptually distinct from the differential object-association hypothesis because it concerns the amount of activation given to a node that is in the person's mental network (as opposed to whether a representation of an object associated with a color exists in the person's mental network).
To illustrate the differential activation hypothesis, Fig. 7 compares WAVEnets for Person A and Person B for a particular shade of red. WAVEnet diagrams that code activation do so using the opacity 5 of the elements to representing object activation (more opaque ? stronger activation) (Schloss et al., in press ). Both associate all the same objects with this shade of red: ripe strawberries, bloody wounds, and other objects o 3 À o 11 . Both WAVEnets represent the same valence for all of these objects, including a relatively strong liking for ripe strawberries (represented by its large size) and a dislike for bloody wounds (represented by its small size). However, Person A was recently reminded of ripe strawberries (opaque) and not reminded of bloody wounds (translucent), whereas Person B was reminded of bloody wounds (opaque) but not ripe strawberries (translucent). This difference in activation causes the liked ripe strawberries to factor more into Person A's preference for red than disliked bloody wounds do, and the opposite to be so for Person B. If all else is equal, Person A should therefore like this red more than Person B does. Returning to the WAVE equation, we represent differential activation by adding a second, multiplicative weighting term, a oit , that represents the degree of activation a of a given object o at a given moment in time t (Schloss et al., in press ), for a given individual i.
The rationale is that a strong activation weight term for a positive object in the WAVE calculation (relative to the other objects associated with that color) should tend to increase preference for the associated color, whereas a strong activation weight term for a negative object (relative to the other objects associated with that color) should tend to decrease preference for the associated color. The t-subscript is also added to other terms in the equation that might vary dynamically over time. 6 We note that if one wanted to capture average temporal changes across all participants, the i subscript would drop out, as in Schloss et al. (in press ).
Thus, the extended WAVE equation (W cit ) can be used to predict preference for a given color c at a given moment in time t of a given individual i. The term n cit represents the number of objects that an individual associates with the given color at a given moment in time. It embodies the differential object association hypothesis, in that different individuals can have different numbers of objects associated with color c, depending on their previous experiences. Further, as individuals accrue experiences with new objects that become associated with a given color over time, the number of objects that go into the WAVE calculation will increase. An implication is that if n cit increases monotonically over time (and all else is equal), the amount that any one object influences preference for the associated color will decrease.
The term w coit represents the degree to which individual i perceives the color of object o as matching color c at time t. As mentioned in footnote 6, it is not clear whether objects that change color over time are still the same object: e.g., do the green leaves of spring count as the same mental objects as the red, yellow, orange, and brown leaves of autumn? Although we do not know the ''right" answer, we included t in the extended WAVE equation (Eq. (5)) to allow for the possibility that object-color matches for the same object might change. It is easier to conceive of how differences in object color-match judgments might differ across individuals than across times, as implied by the inclusion of the subscript i. For example, color deficient individuals would associate different perceptual experiences with the same objects as color typical individuals, which could contribute to individual differences in color preferences. Álvaro et al. (2015) studied the color preferences of dichromats and found systematic differences in their color preferences when compared with trichromatic males. 5 Increases in opacity on a white background corresponds to making nodes darker.
Therefore, if WAVEnets were placed on a black background, increasing opacity would make the nodes appear lighter. 6 It is clear that there can be temporal differences in valence v (objects become more/less liked at different times, in different contexts) and differences in activation a (objects are more/less salient in the observer's mind). However, it is unclear whether object colors can change their degree of match with a given color over time and still retain their identity as the same object within this model. As considered in Schloss et al. (in press) , if a new, saturated red sweater has been worn and washed for years so that it is old and faded, is it still the same ''sweater", or has it changed from being a ''new sweater" to a different object, an ''old, worn out sweater"? This interesting philosophical question is beyond the scope of this article, however, and we simply assume that color changes over time are possible within the model to make it uniform and internally consistent. may arise, in part, from variations in the degree to which the same objects might be associated with different colors (Schloss, 2015) .
The term v oit represents individual i's valence, or preference, for object o at time t. As described in Section 3.3.1 on the differential valence hypothesis, individual differences in color preferences can be predicted by individual differences in preferences for the same color-associated objects (Schloss, Hawthorne-Madell et al., 2015) . And, if those individuals' preferences for the same objects are updated from new experiences, then color preferences should also be updated (e.g., preference for colors associated with one's romantic partner might change from before vs. after a bad breakup).
Finally, the term a oit represents the amount of activation a object o has in individual i's mind at time t. Following the differential activation hypothesis, activation might vary between individuals over time depending on current events, such as elections (Schloss & Palmer, 2014) , temporally specific objects and activities that change with the seasons (Schloss et al., in press) , or recent experiences with colored objects , as discussed below.
Although empirical research motivates all of the individual components of this equation, including how individuals' pattern of color preferences differ at a particular time point (Schloss, Hawthorne-Madell et al., 2015) and how that pattern changes over time in average data (Schloss et al., in press) , the equation has not yet been used to predict individual differences in how preferences change over time. However, Strauss et al. (2013) did test for temporal changes that varied at the level of the individual subjects for a few select colors, as we describe below.
Initial support for the differential activation hypothesis came from a study in which participants' preference for a given color was systematically changed by priming them with pictures of positive/negative objects of that color . The logic is that showing observers images of objects should increase the activation of those objects in the observers' minds, relative to other objects that are associated with the same colors but not primed in the image set. This should result in an increase in preference for colors associated with the positive objects and decrease in preference for the colors associated with the negative objects. It also predicts that the magnitude of the change for any individual should depend on their valence for the objects associated with the colors. (See Strauss et al., 2013 for a description of careful measures taken to ensure participants did not know the experimenters were trying to change their color preferences).
At the group level, participants in the R+/GÀ group, who saw images of 10 positive red objects (e.g., ripe strawberries and red roses) and 10 negative green objects (e.g., vomit and snot), showed significant increases in their preference for red and marginally significant decreases in their preference for green, relative to their baseline preferences at the start of the experiment (Fig. 8) . Participants in the opposite G+/RÀ group, who saw positive green objects (e.g., ripe kiwi fruit and healthy trees) and negative red objects (e.g., bloody eyeballs and open wounds), showed opposite changes in color preference. These changes in color preferences only occurred when people were asked to evaluate how much they liked the objects.
At the individual level, the degree to which participants showed the aforementioned changes depended on how much they liked/disliked the positive/negative objects they saw. Strauss et al. (2013) found this result by correlating the differences between 46 individuals' preference ratings for the red vs. green objects (R o -G o ) with the differences between their change in preferences for the red and green colors (DR c -DG c ). The correlation was significantly positive (r(44) = +0.41, p < 0.01). That is, individuals who loved the strawberries, roses, and other positive red objects they saw and were disgusted by the vomit, snot, and other negative green objects they saw showed greater changes in color preferences than individuals who only moderately liked strawberries and roses, and were not much bothered by vomit and snot.
In a different set of participants, Strauss et al. (2013) also found systematic individual differences in the degree to which these changes in color preferences lasted overnight. Analyses of the average data suggested the effects were short-lived, diminishing after a 24-h delay, but the degree to which they lasted for each individual depended on the magnitude of the change on the first day. For example, those participants in the G+/RÀ group (n = 33) who had large decreases in preference for red after experiencing images of negative red objects were more likely to exhibit that same reduced preference on the next day compared to those who showed only moderate decreases on the first day (r(31) = +0.69, p < 0.001). These results further support the notion that individual differences in the activation of color-related objects at the time of testing influence individual differences in color preferences. Further evidence supporting the differential activation hypothesis comes from a subsequent study of political affiliation and color preferences.
7 It shows that color preferences can vary systematically as activations change over time according to real political events (Schloss & Palmer, 2014) . On non-Election Days in the US, when political affiliation and party colors were not especially salient, Republicans (somewhat surprisingly) liked Democratic-blue more than Democrats did, and there was no difference in preferences for Republican-red. In contrast, on Election Day, when political affiliations were presumably more activated in people's minds, color preferences for both Republicans and Democrats became more closely aligned with people's preferences for their own political parties. That is, Republicans' preferences for Republican-red significantly increased on Election Day, such that they liked it better than Democrats did. And, Republican's preference for Democratic-blue slightly decreased and Democrats preferences for Democratic-blue slightly increased, such that there was no longer a difference between the two parties (in the unexpected direction). These results imply that social group affiliation not only influences differences in color preferences, but the degree to which they do so depends on how strongly activated those affiliated groups are in the participants' minds at the time they rate their color preferences. The conclusions based on these results are limited by the fact that different people were tested on Election Day vs. non-Election Days, and by relying on natural variation in activation of group affiliation due to current events. To better understand the effects of relative activation of group affiliations, it would be useful to conduct a laboratory study in which affiliation activation is systematically varied within individuals through experimental manipulations.
In a more extended study of temporal effects, Schloss et al. (in press) evaluated the relation between seasonal variations and color preferences. Color preferences were measured in a within-subjects design four times over the course of a single year in the Northeast of the US, where environmental colors change markedly between seasons. Data were collected during the height of the seasons (i.e., in fall once the leaves had turned, in winter around the snowiest times, in spring once the trees and flowers had bloomed, and in summer around the hottest times). Seasonal WAVEs were calculated from seasonal object valences and season-object associations, which were used as a measure of activation, as described below.
Both the differential valence hypothesis and the differential activation hypothesis are potentially relevant to the results of this study. The differential valence hypothesis predicts that if there are changes in people's valences for the associated objects (e.g., liking pumpkins more in the fall than in the winter, spring, or summer) then there should be corresponding changes in preference for the colors of those objects. The differential activation hypothesis predicts that if seasonal objects are more active in an observer's mind during a given season (e.g., if pumpkins are more strongly activated during fall than in winter, spring, or summer), then those objects will factor more into color preferences during that season than during other seasons. If season-specific objects have a valence that is greater than the mean valence of all the objects, then increasing activation of those objects should increase preference for the colors of those objects. The opposite would be true of the seasonal objects that have a more negative valence.
There was evidence of systematic variations in color preferences, primarily for the colors of autumn: i.e., dark reds, yellows, oranges, and browns were more preferred in autumn than during other seasons of the year. Those variations might have been driven by changes in the activation of seasonally appropriate objects across seasons (differential activation), by changes in the valences of seasonally appropriate objects across seasons (differential valence), or both. Using the extended WAVE equation (Eq. (5), excluding i because the analysis was on group means), the results showed clear evidence that the seasonal effects were due primarily to changes in the activation strength of seasonally appropriate objects (e.g., pumpkins being more activated in autumn than in other seasons). The correlation of seasonal difference scores (fall minus other seasons) with seasonal difference WAVEs based on activation changes alone was significant (r(30) = 0.51, p = 0.003), the corresponding correlation based on valence changes alone was non-significant (r(30) = 0.29, p = 0.107), and the corresponding correlation based on both valence and activation changes was also significant (r(30) = 0.52, p = 0.002), but no different from the correlation based on activation changes alone. These data clearly support the differential activation hypothesis within participants over time in group data. We presume it holds for individual participants as well, but the data were not analyzed for these possibilities. Although these data do not support the differential valence hypothesis for temporal differences, that does not mean that changes in valence cannot cause changes in color preferences; it simply means that they do not explain the seasonal variations measured in this study.
Additional factors concerning individual differences in color preferences
Although we have presented evidence that the EVT can explain some aspects of individual differences in color preferences based on ecological, object-based factors, it is unclear whether it can provide a complete account of them. Consider, for example, that combined-WAVEs, which are based on individual's preferences for generic and idiosyncratic color-associated objects, explained an average of only 37% of the variance in individual participants' color preferences, with the additional 63% left unexplained (Schloss, Hawthorne-Madell et al., 2015) . (squares), and average of the other control colors (triangles) for participants in the R+/GÀ and GÀ/R+ object exposure group. Error bars represent the standard errors of the means of the difference scores (adapted from Strauss et al. (2013) ).
7 At the time of the study there were no official party colors for the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States, but the Republican party was characteristically paired with red (Republican leaning states were called ''red states") and the Democratic party was characteristically paired with blue (Democratic leaning states were called ''blue states") (Enda, 2012) . Without standard versions of Republican-red and Democratic-blue, Schloss and Palmer (2014) chose the colors for these two conditions based on the colors that were on the official party websites at the time of the study.
systematically probed the influence of all the ecological associations that colors appear to have, including not only common concrete objects (e.g., sky and leaves), but symbols (e.g., religious symbols and corporate logos), abstract concepts (e.g., patriotism and ecological friendliness), fashions (e.g., colors that are ''in" and ''out" for a given year), socio-cultural institutions (e.g., sports teams, universities, religions, and political groups), compatibility with one's own natural coloration (e.g., colors that ''go well with" one's eyes, skin, and hair), social congruence (e.g., colors preferred by family and friends), and no doubt many more. Some of these factors have been demonstrated to affect color preferences in group studies (e.g., the Berkeley/Stanford experiment of ) but have not been explicitly included in individual differences studies (e.g., Schloss, Hawthorne-Madell et al., 2015) . Below we consider a number of such factors that have not yet been discussed above.
Symbolic and abstract conceptual associations
One potentially relevant factor is the effect of symbolic associations on color preferences. In Palmer and Schloss's (2010) original WAVE procedure they explicitly excluded associations that were symbolic (e.g., anger with reds and calmness with blues) rather than object-based (e.g., blood with reds and lakes with blues). However, colors can have strong symbolic associations that may factor into color preferences Palmer et al., submitted; Saito, 1996) . Moreover, these symbolic effects may differ from one culture to another. For example, Chinese participants associated reds with ''revolution" and ''auspicious" whereas US did not, and US participants associated reds with ''anger" and ''sexuality" whereas Chinese participants did not (Palmer et al., submitted) .
In light of such considerations, Palmer et al. (submitted) examined the role of associations with concrete objects versus those with symbols and abstract concepts in the US and China. They applied the WAVE measurement procedure in two different groups in each culture: one provided only object-based associations to the same 32 colors as in Palmer and Schloss (2010) and the other group provided symbolic and abstract conceptual associations for the same colors. They then computed WAVE values separately for the object-based associations (Object-WAVEs) and the symbolic associations (Symbolic-WAVEs) to compare their importance in affecting color preferences.
The results showed that for Chinese participants, the SymbolicWAVEs actually explained more variance (54%) than the ObjectWAVEs did (25%), but for US participants, the opposite is true: Symbolic-WAVEs explained much less variance (34%) than the Object-WAVES did (80%). That study did not include measurements of individual differences in object-based versus symbolic effects, but given that knowledge of one's cultural practices and associations are part of each person's identity, it follows that such differences are likely sources of individual differences. Indeed, such differences might well generalize to different groups of individuals within China and/or within the US. To take one hypothetical example, the fact that object-based WAVEs account for less variance among females than males in the UK (Taylor & Franklin, 2012) might be due to females having more salient symbolic associations with colors than males do, at least in the UK. Exploring such possibilities will require additional research.
Another open question is how such symbolic and conceptual associations might be related to object-based associations. Palmer et al. (submitted) treated them separately, depending on whether the verbal associates referred to concrete, physical objects or abstract, symbolic concepts. But it is clear that they are often intimately related. Red is surely associated with anger, at least in part, because people's faces redden when they become angry.
Green is associated with environmental friendliness, at least in part, because so much of healthy vegetation is green. Yellow is associated with high prestige and heroism in China, at least in part, because yellow was the emperor's color in Imperial China, but it is associated with cowardice in the US, no doubt in part, because yellow is the color of urine and urination is often associated with extreme levels of fear. Palmer et al. (submitted) reported that the correlation between object-based WAVEs and symbolic WAVEs was significant in both the US (r(30) = +0.65, p < 0.001) and China (r(30) = +0.45, p < 0.001), but they did not study the underlying reasons for such commonalities. Further research is likely required to reveal the reasons.
Color in design
Color is a major factor in many kinds of design, from home décor to apparel to corporate logos. In home décor, for example, color preferences are clearly important in choosing the colors to paint the walls of one's home. What variables determine how people decide? One factor might be how colors help achieve certain symbolic or conceptual goals. de Destefani and Whitfield (2008) found that people's choices for the colors of rooms depended on the affective qualities they wanted the room to have. This result implies that individuals would have different preferences for the colors of say, bedroom walls, depending on whether they wanted the wall colors to be ''calm" or ''energetic." This possible source of individual differences is related to the symbolic associations of colors just discussed, but in an application that is specific to a particular context (e.g., people who like calm bedroom walls versus people who like energetic bedroom walls).
Yet another set of potential factors that concern the colors people choose to wear and decorate their living spaces is preferences for different color combinations, given that colors are rarely if ever experienced in isolation. For example, evidence suggests that the degree to which individuals like particular colors for t-shirts depends on how well they think the colors go with their skin tones . There was a high correlation between ratings of how much people liked the colors of T-shirts and how compatible they thought the color each T-shirt was with their skin tone (r = +0.66, p < 0.001).
This relation between liking colors and how well they ''go with" a person's own skin color may be motivated by preferring colors that make them ''look good," because the given color is consistent with a general aesthetic ''preference for harmony" for perceptual stimuli (Palmer & Griscom, 2013; . Preference for color harmony is the degree to which people like color combinations that are perceived as ''going well together." Although there have been several models of what determines judgments of harmony in the recent literature, they largely agree that harmony increases with greater hue similarity (e.g., Ou & Luo, 2006; Szabó, Bodrogi, & Schanda, 2010) . Participants agree much more closely on which color combinations are harmonious than they do on which color combinations they personally prefer . Palmer and Griscom (2013) further investigated whether preference for harmony constitutes a stable individual difference across different domains, including colors, shapes, and music. Individuals first rated their preference, and then rated the harmony of several kinds of stimuli: color combinations, piano compositions, visual shapes, and spatial relations between a small circle and a large enclosing rectangle. People tended to prefer stimuli that they perceived as more harmonious (+0.47 < r < +0.97), including color combinations (r = +0.80). Although the degree of preference for harmony varied fairly widely across individuals, it was relatively stable within individuals when measured for different stimuli. That is, individuals who had a high preference for harmony in one domain (e.g., color) tended to also have a high preference for harmony in other domains (e.g., music). To (over) simplify, people who prefer brown-on-beige to purple-on-orange are likely also to prefer Haydn and Mozart to Stravinsky and Rachmaninoff, and vice versa.
Returning to the issue of preference for harmony in T-shirt color preferences, it is possible that individuals who have a higher preference for harmony have a greater preference to wear colors that ''go better" with their complexion. This is, however, an open question for future inquiry.
Psychophysical and/or physiological factors
In their initial study proposing and testing the EVT using the original WAVE equation, Palmer and Schloss (2010) also formulated and tested a psychophysical model of color preferences based on color appearances. It is closely related conceptually to the cone contrast model of Hurlbert and Ling (2007) , except that the linearly weighted variables were based on the people's ratings of 4 dimensions of color appearance (saturation, lightness, redness/greenness, and blueness/yellowness) rather than on dimensions of physiological cone contrast measures. This color appearance model fit their group data better (explaining 53% of the variance) than the cone contrast model (37%), but not nearly as well as the original WAVE formulation of the EVT (80%).
To examine the independent contribution of these psychophysical and physiological factors to individual differences in color preferences, beyond that which could be explained by the combined-WAVE (37% explained), Schloss, Hawthorne-Madell et al. (2015) included them in a multiple linear regression analysis. Including the color appearance dimensions along with the combinedWAVEs increased the percentage of predicted variance from an average of 37% to 65%. Including the cone contrast predictors with the combined-WAVEs increased the percentage of predicted variance from 37% to 61%. Thus, including non-ecological differences between individuals due to psychophysical and/or physiological factors augments color preference models. Although these increases are substantial, the increase in parameters is also substantial: from one parameter per participant for the combined-WAVE predictions alone to five parameters for the hybrid models based on the combined-WAVE and the four parameters of the color-appearance (or cone contrast) model. It must also be noted that these psychophysical and physiological models do not really explain the individual differences they help to predict. The reason is that, as presently formulated, they constitute curve-fitting tests without an explicit, coherent, theoretical rationale for why color preferences for different people might depend on color appearances in the way they do.
It is possible to consider physiological rationales from which such individual differences might be derived. It is not clear how they would account for individual differences in typical trichromats, given the lack of correspondence between physiological factors (e.g., the relative number of S, M, and L cones present in the retina (Roorda & Williams, 1999) and perceptual color appearance (Brainard et al., 2000) . A more plausible case can be constructed for the influence of color deficiencies, including color weakness as well as dichromacy. For example, Álvaro et al. (2015) reported systematic differences between the color preferences of male protoanopes and dueteranopes, both of which also differ from the color preferences of male trichromats.
It is tempting to presume that such differences in color preferences of color deficient individuals are determined strictly by physiological or psychophysical factors, but ecological experiences may also be involved. For example, consider the fact that typical trichromats generally prefer saturated colors (Guilford & Smith, 1959; McManus et al., 1981; Palmer & Schloss, 2010) . Using a modified cone-contrast predictor to account for differences in color perception, Álvaro et al. (2015) found that dichromats also prefer colors that appear more saturated to them. Perhaps high saturation is preferred due their high firing rate in certain neural systems of the brain. However, preference for saturated colors among typical trichromats is predicted by the WAVEs for those colors, because the average valences of objects associated with more saturated colors tend to be more positive than the average valences of objects associated with less saturated colors (Palmer & Schloss, 2010) . So, one interesting (and as yet unanswered) question is whether WAVEs for dichromats would also account for their preference for saturated colors.
The WAVEs of dichromats should differ from those of trichromats because different objects with different valences would be averaged together in the two groups (Schloss, 2015) . Some colors that appear different to trichromats are metamers to dichromats (i.e., are not discriminable), which implies that objects associated with distinct colors for trichromats will be associated with the same colors for dichromats. For example, trichromats associate delicious ripe tomatoes with saturated red and disgusting biological wastes with dark yellow. Those same object categories might not be associated with distinct color experiences for dichromats because saturated red and dark yellow can be confusable (Brettel, Viénot, & Mollon, 1997) . In that case, the disparate valences of ripe tomatoes and biological wastes would be averaged in their WAVE measurements because those object categories would be associated with similar color experiences. Whether such ecological considerations can explain individual differences in color preferences due to differences in color perception is an empirical question that is ripe for future research.
Summary and conclusion
In this article we articulated three ecologically based hypotheses for temporal and individual differences in color preferences and reviewed prior literature in light of their predictions. We also defined an extended WAVE equation (Eq. (5)), which provides a way to predict temporal and individual differences within a single framework. It implies that preference for a color should change over time and/or differ between individuals when there are differences in the valences of objects associated with the color (differential valence hypothesis), when there are differences in the set of objects associated with the color (differential object-association hypothesis), and when there are differences in the activation of objects that are associated with the color (differential activation hypothesis). We reviewed empirical evidence for several of these predictions and pointed out open questions that have not yet been tested.
It is possible that the way object valences, object-color matches, and activations combine in the human mind is different from and far more complicated than what is captured by even the extended WAVE equation. More focused testing of the model's underlying assumptions should help elucidate the nature and variety of interactions among these and related ecological factors. There may also be substantial aspects of individual differences that cannot be explained by the WAVE model or, indeed, any purely ecological model, because color preferences may also depend, in part, on non-ecological factors, such as cone pigments and various neural variables that have not yet been measured.
The approach of studying preferences for colors presented on a computer screen is only a small part of the picture of understanding color preference and color-based decision making. People make color choices in their daily lives when deciding what clothes to wear, which products to by, and how to design their homes, but the basis for these choices are still not well understood. Why might one have a strong desire to wear a red shirt one day, but a blue shirt the next day? Why does one decide to buy red cooking utensils, but blue dishes? Based on preliminary research on how colors vary across context, we believe that it will be necessary to understand how colors influence emotions and how colors communicate information in social contexts to fully understand individual differences in color preferences.
